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Abstract
The Colonel Blotto game is a famous game commonly used to model resource
allocation problems in many domains ranging from security to advertising. Two
players distribute a fixed budget of resources on multiple battlefields to maximize
the aggregate value of battlefields they win, each battlefield being won by the player
who allocates more resources to it. The continuous version of the game—where
players can choose any fractional allocation—has been extensively studied, albeit
only with partial results to date. Recently, the discrete version—where allocations
can only be integers—started to gain traction and algorithms were proposed to
compute the equilibrium in polynomial time; but these remain computationally
impractical for large (or even moderate) numbers of battlefields. In this paper, we
propose an algorithm to compute very efficiently an approximate equilibrium for
the discrete Colonel Blotto game with many battlefields. We provide a theoretical
bound on the approximation error as a function of the game’s parameters. We also
propose an efficient dynamic programming algorithm in order to compute for each
game instance the actual value of the error. We perform numerical experiments
that show that the proposed strategy provides a fast and good approximation to the
equilibrium even for moderate numbers of battlefields.
1 Introduction
1.1 Motivations and contributions
The past decade has seen a rising interest in using game-theoretic models for security problems, see
e.g., [27]. As the modern world is facing increasingly important security threats, such models are
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interesting because they allow deriving defenses that are optimized against adaptive adversaries for
different specific applications such as patrolling or screening problems, see e.g., [8, 6, 30, 19, 9, 10, 7,
29] amongst others. Several solutions of game-theoretic models have been implemented in real-world
defense applications with positive results, validating the importance and relevance of game theory for
security problems [22, 31].
Recently, the community started to gain interest in the celebrated Colonel Blotto game. In the Colonel
Blotto game, two players (often referred to as colonels) choose how to distribute a fixed budget of
resources (often called troops or soldiers) on a number of battlefields. Each battlefield has a given
value and is won by the player who allocates more resources to it; each player maximizes the sum
of values of battlefields he wins. As a simple and elegant model for strategic resource allocation
problems, the Colonel Blotto game (and in particular the characterization of its equilibrium) has
important applications in many domains including security (allocation of defense/attacks resources),
but also politics (allocation of campaign resources or lobbying resources), industrial operations
(allocation of R&D resources) or advertisement (allocation of ad budgets). Its continuous version
(where players can choose any fractional allocation), has received high attention from the economics
community since its first introduction in 1921. However, only partial results are known to date;
in particular, the equilibrium characterization in the general case of parameters configuration still
remains as a challenging open question (see related works below).
The discrete version of the Colonel Blotto game (where allocations can only be integers), which is
meaningful in applications where individual troops cannot be divided, started to gain traction much
more recently in the algorithmic game theory community. Since it is a finite constant-sum game, it can
in principle be solved numerically in general cases through linear programming. However, standard
solutions to compute the Nash equilibria face the issue that the strategy space of the players grows
exponentially with the number of battlefields and the number of troops. To tackle this problem, two
algorithms were proposed in the last two years in [1] and [2]. Both algorithms rely on transforming
the linear program formulation which significantly improves the complexity. Yet, these algorithms
still become computationally impractical when the number of battlefields and/or the number of
troops is large (e.g., it takes over 1 day to solve instances with 45 battlefields and 75 troops in our
simulations). In applications such as security or politics, it is frequent that these parameters are large.
In that case, the question remains open: how to efficiently compute an equilibrium strategy?
In this work, we take a different approach that relaxes the equilibrium notion considered to gain
dramatically in computational efficiency: we propose and analyze an algorithm to compute very effi-
ciently an approximate Nash equilibrium for the discrete Colonel Blotto game with many battlefields
and troops. Specifically, denoting by n the number of battlefields and by p the number of troops of
the stronger player, we make the following contributions:
1. We propose a mixed strategy, which we term discrete independently uniform strategy (hereinafter
DIU strategy). Inspired by partial results on the equilibrium marginals in the continuous version of
the game, our strategy first generates allocations independently on each battlefield with appropriately
defined distributions, then rescales them and performs a rounding process that guarantees the integer
constraint while maintaining the budget constraint. This has complexity O(n).
2. Denoting Vn the total payoff of the game, we prove that the DIU strategy is an ε̄Vn-equilibrium.
We give a theoretical bound on ε̄ that shows how good of an approximation to the Nash equilibrium
the DIU strategy is depending on n and p.
3. We propose a dynamic programing algorithm to compute a best-response of a player to a given set
of marginals (on each battlefield) of the adversary. Our algorithm has complexity O(p2 · n). It allows
us to efficiently compute the actual value of ε̄ for any given set of parameters of the game.
4. We perform numerical experiments that illustrate that the proposed DIU strategy provides a good
approximation to the equilibrium even for a relatively moderate number of battlefields. We also
compare our solution to the exact equilibrium found with the algorithm of [2] both in terms of the
payoff obtained and the computation time.
Our proposed algorithm computes directly a realization of the strategy, rather than computing the
mixed strategy of the players (i.e., the equilibrium distribution) as in [1, 2]. In practice, this is what
a player would need to generate his allocation. Yet, even though the distribution from which our
strategy is drawn is only implicitly defined, we prove that it provides an approximate equilibrium.
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Besides, it is possible to generate this distribution with arbitrary precision simply by generating many
realizations independently using our proposed algorithm.
Note finally that our approximate equilibrium is not “universal” in that it does not provide a good
approximation for any parameter values. Roughly the approximation is good if the numbers of
battlefields and troops are large. Yet, our proposed approximate equilibrium provides an important
contribution because (i) it is a realistic case in several applications and (ii) it is precisely the case
where exact equilibrium computation algorithms are computationally infeasible.
1.2 Related works
The Colonel Blotto game was first introduced in 1921 in its continuous version [4]. Since then,
a number of partial solutions have been proposed. The case of symmetric players (with identical
budgets) with an arbitrary number of battlefields was solved by [5, 11, 12], which also provided a
solution for the asymmetric case with two battlefields (see also [17]). In 2006, a solution was found
for the case of asymmetric players with an arbitrary number of battlefields but only for homogeneous
battlefields (all with identical value) [25]. This solution was extended in [26] to heterogeneous
battlefields but only under some restrictions. Today, the general case of asymmetric players with
heterogeneous battlefields remains unsolved for the continuous Blotto game.
Many extensions and variants of the continuous Colonel Blotto game have been studied: relaxing the
budget constraint [21, 16], considering other objectives [18] or analyzing sequential moves [23, 24].
Many applications have also been considered, e.g., to politics [17], economics [15], security [23],
and social networks [20].
The discrete version of the Colonel Blotto game has received far less attention. Partial results for
special cases are proven in [13, 14]. In the last two years, the discrete Colonel Blotto game attracted
interest from the algorithmic game theory community. Two algorithms were proposed to compute
the Nash equilibrium for the general asymmetric and heterogeneous case. A first algorithm was
proposed in [1], based on a reduction to an exponential-size linear program and a clever use of the
Ellipsoid method to solve it in polynomial time. In [2], another algorithm was proposed that obtains
a polynomial-size linear program and solves it using the Simplex method. Although both algorithms
are providing polynomial-time/size solutions to find the Nash equilibrium of the discrete Colonel
Blotto game, they remain computationally intractable in practice with large numbers of troops and/or
battlefields.
1.3 Outline of the paper
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we formally describe the problem
and introduce the notation used throughout the paper. In Section 3, we give the main results of
the paper, including the construction of the DIU strategy and Theorem 3.2 stating that it is an
approximated equilibrium of large-scale games. The sketch of the proof of this theorem is given in
Section 5. Several numerical experiments are constructed and the results are discussed to evaluate
the efficiency of DIU strategy. Finally, the detailed proofs of all lemmas and theorems are given in
the Appendix.
2 Problem Formulation
2.1 Game model
We consider a discrete Colonel Blotto game between two players denoted A and B. Each player has
a fixed amount of troops (or budget), denoted m and p for A and B respectively, where m, p ∈ N.
Without loss of generality, we assume that A is the weak player, i.e., m ≤ p. Throughout the paper,
we denote by λ := pm the ratio of players budgets.
The game is a one-shot game where players simultaneously allocate their troops to n battlefields
(n ≥ 3). A pure strategy of player A is a vector x̂A ∈ Nn, with integer elements x̂Ai ≥ 0 representing
the allocation to battlefield i (i = 1, 2 . . . , n) and satisfying the constraint
∑n
i=1 x̂
A
i ≤ m. Similarly,
a pure strategy of player B is a vector x̂B ∈ Nn such that the constraint
∑n
i=1 x̂
B
i ≤ p holds.
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Each battlefield i is commonly assessed by players with a fixed value vi > 0. Values can be
heterogeneous across battlefields, but we assume that each value belongs to a bounded range:
vi ∈ [vmin, vmax], with 0 < vmin ≤ vmax. We denote by Vn =
∑n
i=1 vi the total value of all battle-
fields.
Once players have allocated their troops, the player who has the higher allocation to battlefield i wins
that battlefield and gains its whole value vi. In case of a tie, i.e., if xAi = x
B
i , player A gains αvi and
player B gains (1− α) vi for some constant α ∈ [0, 1] fixed. This is a very general tie-breaking rule
that includes all previously considered rules such as sharing 50-50 (α = 0.5) or giving the battlefield
to the stronger player (α = 0). Each player chooses his strategy to maximize his own payoff equal to
the sum of gains on each battlefield. Resources not allocated to any battlefield have no outside value.
2.2 Additional notation and definitions
For brevity, we denote by CBm,pn the discrete Colonel Blotto game with n battlefields where player A
has m troops and player B has p troops. We denote by ΠA (σ, γ) and ΠB (σ, γ) the expected payoffs
of players A and B when playing strategies σ and γ respectively. Throughout the paper, we denote by
FX the distribution function of a random variable X . We use a hat (ẑ) to denote integers.
We use the standard definition of an approximate equilibrium as follows: given ε ≥ 0, a strat-
egy profile (σ∗, γ∗) is an ε-equilibrium of the game CBm,pn if ΠA(σ, γ∗) ≤ ΠA(σ∗, γ∗) + ε and
ΠB(σ
∗, γ) ≤ ΠB(σ∗, γ∗) + ε for any strategy σ and γ of player A and B. When it is unnecessary to
emphasize the approximation error, we use the term approximate equilibrium.
3 Main results
In this section, we give our proposed strategy and main theoretical results showing that it is an
approximate equilibrium.
3.1 The DIU strategy
Considering the game CBm,pn , we propose a mixed strategy that we call Discrete Independently
Uniform strategy (DIU strategy), which will be proven to be an approximate equilibrium of the game.
Intuitively, under the DIU strategy, players first draw independently numbers from some particular
uniform-type distributions; then they rescale these numbers to guarantee the budget constraints;
finally, they use a specific rounding process to ensure the discrete requirements.
To formalize the DIU strategy definition, we introduce, for any i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, the uniform-type
distributions:
FA∗i (x) :=
(
1− 1
λ
)
+
x
2 viVnλ
1
λ
,∀x ∈
[
0, 2
vi
Vn
λ
]
, (3.1)
FB∗i (x) :=
x
2 viVnλ
,∀x ∈
[
0, 2
vi
Vn
λ
]
. (3.2)
These distributions depend on n the number of battlefields. Moreover, we observe that FB∗i is
the (continuous) uniform distribution on [0, 2viλ/Vn] and FA∗i is the distribution where we set a
probability mass (1− 1/λ) at 0 and uniformly distribute the remaining mass on (0, 2viλ/Vn]. We
define the rounding function rm :
[
0, pm
]
→
{
0, 1m ,
2
m , . . . ,
p
m
}
, such that ∀x, rm(x) = x̂m , where
x̂ ∈ N is uniquely determined and satisfies x̂m −
1
2m ≤ x <
x̂
m +
1
2m .
We can now give the formal definition of the DIU strategy.3
Definition 3.1 (The DIU strategy). In the game CBm,pn , DIUA (respectively, DIUB) is the mixed
strategy where player A’s allocation x̂A (respectively, player B’s allocation x̂B) is randomly gener-
ated from Algorithm 1.
3We use the term DIU strategy to commonly address DIUA and/or DIUB when it is unnecessary to emphasize
a particular player.
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Algorithm 1: DIU strategy generation algorithm.
Input: n,m, p ∈ N, and v ∈ [vmin, vmax]n
Output: x̂A, x̂B ∈ Nn
1 λ = pm
2 for i = 1, 2, . . . , n do
3 ai =
{
0 with probability 1− 1λ
∼ U
(
0, 2viVn λ
]
otherwise
4 if
∑n
j=1 aj = 0 then repeat line 2
5 for i = 1, 2, . . . , n do
6 bi =∼ U
[
0, 2viVn λ
]
7 sA0 = s
B
0 = 0
8 for i = 1, 2, . . . , n do
9 sAi =
∑i
k=1
ak∑n
j=1 aj
; sBi =
∑i
k=1
bk∑n
j=1 bj
p
m
10 x̂Ai := m
[
rm
(
sAi
)
− rm
(
sAi−1
)]
11 x̂Bi := m
[
rm
(
sBi
)
− rm
(
sBi−1
)]
Remarks Algorithm 1 guarantees that the allocations are integers and satisfy the budget constraints
(with equality, i.e., without any unallocated resource). More importantly, the DIUA (resp., (DIUB))
strategy is only implicitly defined via Algorithm 1, that is to say it is the joint distribution of all
allocations {x̂Ai }i (resp., {x̂Bi }i). Each pure strategy output from Algorithm 1 is only one realization
of the DIU strategy.
Algorithm 1 is easy to implement and runs very fast in expected time O(n). Note that the for loop
in lines 2-4 is not guaranteed to end in a finite time. However, the probability that the loop runs
over k times is (1− 1/λ)kn and converges to zero exponentially fast in k and n. To guarantee that
the algorithm ends in finite time, it is possible to put a stopping criterion and assign an arbitrary
allocation to player A if it is reached. As this will happen with increasingly low probability as n
grows, it can be seen from the proof of Theorem 3.2 that the result will still hold. On the other hand,
the summation
∑n
j=1 bj equals 0 only with probability zero, therefore we do not need an additional
condition for the for loop in lines 5-6.
When applying the DIU strategy, player A’s allocation to battlefield i = 1, 2, . . . , n follows the
marginal distributions FADi while player B ’s allocation follows FBDi whose corresponding random
variables are defined as:
ADi = m
[
rm
(∑i
k=1
Ank
)
− rm
(∑i−1
k=1
Ank
)]
, (3.3)
BDi = m
[
rm
(∑i
k=1
Bnk
)
− rm
(∑i−1
k=1
Bnk
)]
, (3.4)
where for any k = 1, 2, . . . , n,
Ank :=
A∗k∑n
j=1A
∗
j
and Bnk :=
B∗k∑n
j=1B
∗
j
p
m
, (3.5)
and random variables A∗k, B
∗
k have distributions (3.1)-(3.2).
We end this subsection by briefly describing the intuition behind the construction of the DIU strategy
in definition 3.1. First of all, from the equilibrium analysis done in [25] and [26] for the continuous
Colonel Blotto game with n battlefields, where player A’s budget is 1 and player B’s budget is λ, the
equilibrium marginal distributions of players’ allocations to battlefield i follow distributions FA∗i
and FB∗i . That is to say, a joint distribution (if it exists) satisfying the constraint
∑n
i=1 x
A
i ≤ m and
yielding the marginal distributions
{
FA∗i
}
i
will be a feasible strategy of player A which constitutes
an equilibrium of this continuous game. However, the construction of such a strategy (and even its
existence) remains as a challenging open question.
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On the other hand, by employing the DIU strategy in the discrete Colonel Blotto game, players’
marginal allocations at battlefield i follow the distributions FADi and FBDi . These distributions
are rm-rounded from terms expressed by distributions FAni and FBni , which in turn, uniformly
converge towards FA∗i and FB∗i when n→∞. The key idea is that, the requirement to have discrete
allocations in the discrete game is less and less significant when the granularity of the game increases
(i.e. mn ,
p
n → ∞), which makes it similar to the continuous variant. Thus, based on the optimality
in the continuous variant of FA∗i against FB∗i (and vice versa), we expect to have “near-optimality"
in playing DIUA strategy against DIUB strategy (and vice versa), with any arbitrary error ε̄Vn > 0,
given large parameters n,m, p.
3.2 Approximate equilibrium of the discrete Colonel Blotto game
Theorem 3.2. The DIU strategy is an ε̄Vn-equilibrium of the game CBm,pn (m ≤ p), where
ε̄ ≤ max{Õ(n−1/2),O(n/m)} and Vn is the total value of all battlefields4.
The upper bound on ε̄ given by this theorem is important because it allows us to evaluate the
approximation error in terms of the number of battlefields and amount of troops. Indeed, we can
look at Theorem 3.2 from a different perspective and interpret it by an equivalent statement (with
more details):
Restatement of Theorem 3.2. Fix λ ≥ 1 and ε̄ > 0; there exists N∗ = O
(
ε̄−2 ln(ε̄−1)
)
such that
for n ≥ N∗, there exists M∗ = O(n/ε̄) such that for m ≥ M∗ and p = mλ ∈ N, for any pure
strategies x̂A and x̂B of player A and B,
ΠA
(
x̂A,DIUB
)
≤ ΠA (DIUA,DIUB) + ε̄Vn, (3.6)
ΠB
(
DIUA, x̂
B
)
≤ ΠB (DIUA,DIUB) + ε̄Vn. (3.7)
At a high level, this confirms the intuition that if the number of battlefields and the budgets are large
enough, then the DIU strategy yields a near-optimal payoff against the opponent’s DIU strategy. The
precise result shown in this theorem, however, goes much beyond merely showing this convergence
and it is interesting and non-trivial in a number of ways. First, Theorem 3.2 tells us exactly how the
parameters m and n should be to reach a given level of approximation. We notice in particular that if
the ratio m/n is small, then the approximation may not be good, however large n gets.
Second, Theorem 3.2 involves a double limit, with two growing parameters (n andm), and it identifies
a precise scaling regime (i.e., ratio between the two growing parameters) under which the convergence
holds. Here, Theorem 3.2 shows that the DIU strategy converges towards an equilibrium as soon as m
grows at least as fast as n3/2. This implies that, if we first make m grow to infinity, and then make n
grow to infinity, the result will hold. However, the reverse is not true: if n grows first, or simply if m
grows too slowly compared to n, then the DIU does not converge towards an equilibrium. Intuitively,
if the number of troops is low compared to the number of battlefields, then the average number of
troops per battlefield at equilibrium becomes low and the DIU strategy based on a discretization of a
uniform-type distribution is no longer close to optimal.
Note that due to space constraints, we limited the statement of our result to emphasize the de-
pendence on n and m but our proof also allows extracting the dependence of ε̄, α on vmin, vmax
and λ. A more precise definition of the constants given in the restatement of Theorem 3.2 is
N∗ := O
(
2
ε̄2 ln
(
4
ε̄
) [
2
(
vmax
vmin
)2
+ λ
]2 (
vmin
vmax
)2)
and M∗ := O
(
4nvmax
ε̄vminλ
)
max
{
1, 1λ−1
}
. One
then observes that the convergence is slower if vmax/vmin is larger (i.e., the battlefields heterogeneity
is higher) and if λ is larger (i.e., the players asymmetry is higher). Note that we have written the
above discussion with m. The exact same holds with p instead.
Finally, we remark that CBm,pn is a constant-sum game. Therefore, by using inequalities
(3.6) and (3.7), we can straightforwardly prove that the DIU strategy is an approximately max-
min strategy of the game. This is presented as the following corollary of Theorem 3.2.
4The Õ notation is a variant of the big-O notation that “ignores" logarithmic factors.
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Corollary 3.3. ∀λ ≥ 1,∀ε̄ > 0, ∃N∗ = O(ε̄−2 ln(ε̄−1)) : ∀n ≥ N∗, ∃M∗ = O(n/ε̄) : ∀m ≥M∗,
p = mλ ∈ N, in the game CBm,pn , for any strategy σA and σB of player A and B,
min
γ
ΠA(σA, γ) ≤ min
γ
ΠA(DIUA, γ) + ε̄Vn, (3.8)
min
σ
ΠB(σ, σB) ≤ min
σ
ΠB(σ,DIUB) + ε̄Vn. (3.9)
This corollary ensures that the DIU strategy gives the near-optimal payoff to any player Q ∈ {A,B}
even in the worst-case (when the opponent −Q plays the strategy that minimizes Q’s payoff). This
emphasizes the fact that players can “safely" use the DIU strategy in practice.
4 Numerical evaluation
In this section, we turn to the numerical computation of quantities related to the DIU strategy, in
particular to evaluate the quality of the approximation it gives depending on the game’s parameters.
4.1 A dynamic-programming algorithm for the best response
First, computing the value of ε̄ (or how close a given mixed strategy of player A is to equilib-
rium) requires finding player B’s optimal allocation given that player A’s allocation to battlefield
i = 1, 2 . . . , n follows a given marginal distribution {Gi}i=1,2,...,n. This itself is a non-trivial prob-
lem since there is in principle an exponential number of possible allocations to investigate. We
propose an efficient algorithm based on dynamic programming [3] to solve this problem. This is
formally presented as the following proposition.
Proposition 4.1. Algorithm 2 finds a best response strategy of player B and his optimal payoff
against any set of player A’s marginals with complexity O
(
p2 · n
)
.
Note that, although our primary motivation is to compute a best-response of a player to the DIU
strategy, the algorithm has broader applicability since it works for any mixed strategy of the adversary.
We discuss here the main intuition behind Algorithm 2 and give a descriptive proof of Proposition 4.1.
Note firstly that the algorithm is presented here with tie-breaking parameter α = 0 for simplicity but
could straightforwardly be adapted to any tie-breaking rule. In this algorithm, H(j, i) denotes the
expected payoff that player B gains from battlefield i by allocating j troops to it, which is computed
via the equation in line 4. More specifically, since α = 0, by allocating j troops to battlefield i, player
B wins the value vi if j is at least equal to player A’s allocation. Since Gi is the marginal distribution
of player A in this battlefield, then Gi(j) is exactly the probability of this event, which implies the
expected gain of player B. There are (p+ 1)n terms H(j, i) to be computed yielding the complexity
of O(p · n) to do so.
On the other hand, we denote Π(j, i) the optimal payoff of player B when he is allowed to spend j
troops over the set {1, 2, . . . , i} of battlefields; thus, Π(p, n) is exactly the best-response payoff of
player B. The computation of Π(j, i) is done by working backwards with the recursive equation given
in line 5. To spend j troops over i battlefields {1, 2, . . . , i}, player B has to choose k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , j}
which is the number of troops he would then allocate across the first i− 1 battlefields (whose optimal
payoff is denoted Π(k, i − 1)), and put the remaining (j − k) troops on ith−battlefield (which
induces the payoff H(j − k, i)). He then optimizes the payoff to find Π(j, i) by selecting the number
k which maximizes the summation between the payoffs gained from these two parts. There are
[(p+ 1) (n− 1) + 1] terms Π(j, i) needed to be computed, each is done by comparing between at
most (p+ 1) terms; thus it yields the complexity of O(p2 · n) to do so.
Finally, the algorithm finds a best response strategy yielding this optimal payoff with complexity
O(p · n) as in lines 9-11. Therefore, we conclude the proof of Proposition 4.1.
Reversing the roles of A and B, we can construct a similar algorithm with complexity O
(
m2 · n
)
to
find the best response payoff of player A against any given set of player B’s marginals. Note also that
the algorithm is presented here with α = 0 for simplicity but could straightforwardly be adapted to
any tie-breaking rule.
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Algorithm 2: Dynamic programing algorithm searching for player B’s best-response (tie-breaking
rule α = 0).
Input: n,m, p ∈ N, v ∈ [vmin, vmax]n and marginals {Gi}i=1,2,...,n of player A
Output: Payoff Π(p, n) and BR strategy
{
x̂B1 , · · · , x̂Bn
}
1 for j = 0, 1, . . . , p do
2 Π(j, 0) = 0
3 for i = 1, 2, . . . , n do
4 H(j, i) = viGi(j)
5 Π(j, i) = max
k=0,...,j
{Π (k, i− 1) +H (j − k, i)}
6 j = p
7 for i = n, n− 1, . . . , 1 do
8 x̂Bi = arg max
k=0,1,...,j
{Π (j − k, i− 1) +H(k, i)}
9 j = j − x̂Bi
4.2 Numerical experiments
In practice, we first observe that a pure strategy instructing players to allocate their resources following
the DIU strategy can be generated from Algorithm 1 in time O(n), which is negligible even for
extremely large values of the parameters.
On the other hand, since the marginal allocations at battlefield i under the DIU strategy, FADi
and FBDi , are not known in closed-form; we approximate them by the corresponding empirical
CDFs denoted F̄ADi and F̄BDi computed by drawing “many” realizations of the DIU strategy from
Algorithm 1. Indeed, it is known by the Glivenko-Cantelli theorem [28] that the empirical CDF
converges uniformly towards the actual CDF, with a maximum difference in O(K−1/2) where K
is the number of realizations drawn. Then, to guarantee that the approximation of the DIU’s CDF
by its empirical CDF does not affect the computed value of ε̄, we only need to take K ≥ O(n)
(since ε̄ is of the order Õ(n−1/2) according to the previous section). Overall, generating a good
approximation of the DIU’s marginal distribution therefore takes time O(n2), still negligible even for
large values. Finally, to compute ε̄, for each player Q ∈ {A,B}, we compare the expected payoff
ΠQ(DIUA,DIUB) to player Q’s best-response payoff obtained from Algorithm 2 against the set of
marginal distributions
{
F̄(−Q)Di
}
i
of player −Q.
We construct several numerical experiments using R to illustrate the efficiency of using the DIU
strategy as an approximate equilibrium of the discrete Colonel Blotto games5. Our experiments
run on a computer with an Intel core i5-7500U 2.60GHz processor and 8GB of RAM. In all the
experiments, we keep α = 0 and λ = p/m fixed, thus, the values of m and p always have the same
growth rate (up to the multiplicative constant λ). For each instance (of n,m, p, (v1, v2, . . . , vn)) we
run the simulations 3 times then take the average results.
Figure 1(a) shows the results. We first notice that when m (and p) increases, the error ε̄ generally
decreases in consistency with Theorem 3.2. Moreover, when m is relatively small, the error ε̄ is
higher with instances having higher number of battlefields n. This is predicted by Theorem 3.2,
stating that when the ratios m/n and p/n are low (they decrease when n increases), the upper bound
of ε̄ is not good. For instances with higher values of m, these ratios are sufficiently large to ensure
that ε̄ decreases when either m or n (or both) increase. This interpretation is also consistent with the
results shown in Figure 1(b). When the value of n increases, at the beginning where the ratio m/n
is still sufficiently large, ε̄ decreases. However, since we keep m (and p) fixed in this experiment,
the ratio m/n gradually decreases, which makes the errors eventually get worse. Note that, for
each experiment presented here, we independently generate a value for each battlefield uniformly
5Our code for these experiments can be found at https://github.com/dongquan11/Approx_discrete_Blotto
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distributed in [vmin, vmax], with vmin = 1 and vmax = 8. This process explains the randomness
observed in the plots.
(a) m (and p) increases, λ = p
m
= 6/5, log-scale x-axis. (b) m = 425, p = 510, λ = 6/5, n increases.
Figure 1: Approximation error ε̄ of the DIU strategy stated in Theorem 3.2 as a function of the game parameters.
We finally compare our work with the algorithm proposed in [2]6, which finds an exact equilibrium
of the game (we denote it Algorithm EQ). Table 1 shows the computation time of evaluating the
error in using DIU strategy and elapsed time of Algorithm EQ for several instances. We observe that
it takes remarkably less time to compute the DIU strategy payoffs and give an upper bound of the
potential error by using Algorithm 2. Note that the computation times shown here include the time to
compute the empirical CDF of the DIU strategy by drawing sufficiently many realizations (here we
take K = 10 · n guaranteeing not to affect the evaluation on ε̄) and the elapsed time of Algorithm 2.
Moreover, the last column of Table 1 shows that the DIU strategy payoffs are very close to the exact
equilibrium payoffs, even for instances with small values of the parameters m,n and p.
In conclusion, it is important to note that we do not claim that our algorithm can replace more
efficiently the algorithm of [2] (in fact, we are not computing the same thing). However, our results
show that, for large values of n and p, the DIU strategy, which can be computed very efficiently, can
be safely used by the players as it provides a good approximation to the equilibrium.
Table 1: Comparison between DIU error evaluation time and Algorithm EQ.
Instances
(λ = 6/5)
DIU error’s evaluation time Algo. EQ’s
elapsed time
|DIU−EQ|
Vn
∗
eCDF generating Algorithm 2 Total
n = 20,m = 50 0.12s 0.36s 0.49 2540.2s 0.0066
n = 35,m = 50 0.34s 0.67s 1.01s 10238.7s 0.0054
n = 50,m = 100 0.83s 1.99s 2.83s > 1.5 day N/A
n = 100,m = 5000 106.46s 1396.33s 1502.79s N/A N/A
n = 150,m = 8000 380.14s 5153.11s 5533.25s N/A N/A
n = 200,m = 10000 895.36s 10991.66s 11887.02s N/A N/A
*The maximum rescaled difference between DIU payoffs and exact equilibrium payoffs
5 Proof of Theorem 3.2
In this section, we give the main elements of the proof of Theorem 3.2 (in its restatement). We note
that, although the main idea behind the DIU strategy is quite simple, the proof of this theorem is
non-trivial and requires careful analysis to achieve the upper bound on ε̄. Due to space constraints,
we only give the proof of inequality (3.6); the proof of (3.7) can be similarly done. We also omit
less important or more technical details. If ε̄ > 1, (3.6) and (3.7) trivially hold. In the following, we
consider ε̄ ≤ 1 and λ ≥ 1 fixed.
Proof. We start by rewriting (3.6). If player A plays pure strategy x̂A against DIUB, he strictly wins
battlefield i with probability FBDi
(
x̂Ai − 1
)
and has a tie with probability P (BDi = x̂
A
i ). Hence,
6We use the authors’ implementation from https://github.com/Soben713/ColonelBlotto
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according to our general tie-breaking rule,
ΠA
(
x̂A,DIUB
)
=
n∑
i=1
viFBDi
(
x̂Ai − 1
)
+
n∑
i=1
αviP
(
BDi = x̂
A
i
)
.
Similarly, player A’s payoff when both players play DIU strategy is
ΠA (DIUA,DIUB) =
n∑
i=1
vi m∑
ŷ=0
FBDi (ŷ − 1)P
(
ADi = ŷ
)+ n∑
i=1
αvi m∑
ŷ=0
P
(
BDi = ŷ
)
P
(
ADi = ŷ
).
Therefore, to prove (3.6), it is sufficient to prove that, for all i,7
n∑
i=1
viFBDi
(
x̂Ai −1
)
≤
n∑
i=1
vi m∑
ŷ=0
FBDi (ŷ−1)P
(
ADi =ŷ
)+ ε̄
2
Vn, (5.1)
P
(
BDi = x̂
A
i
)
≤
m∑
ŷ=0
P
(
BDi = ŷ
)
P
(
ADi = ŷ
)
+
ε̄
2α
,∀α 6= 0. (5.2)
We observe that (5.1) and (5.2) relate to distributions FADi and FBDi , which are not expressed in
closed form. However, we can approximate them with the distributions FA∗i and FB∗i defined in
(3.1)–(3.2), as stated in the following lemma (see proof in Appendix):
Lemma 5.1. Fix λ ≥ 1, for any ε̄1 ∈ (0, 1], there exists N∗ := O
(
ε̄−21 ln
(
ε̄−11
))
, such that for any
n ≥ N∗, there exists M0 := O (n/ε̄1), such that for any m ≥M0 and i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, we have
sup
x̂∈N
∣∣∣∣FADi (x̂)− FA∗i
(
x̂
m
)∣∣∣∣ < ε̄1 and sup
x̂∈N
∣∣∣∣FBDi (x̂)− FB∗i
(
x̂
m
)∣∣∣∣ < ε̄1.
Since ADi is a discrete random variables for any i, as a direct corollary of Lemma 5.1, for any
n ≥ O
(
ε̄−21 ln
(
ε̄−11
))
and m ≥ O (n/ε̄1), for x̂ ∈ N, we have that∣∣∣∣F̃ADi (x̂)− F̃A∗i
(
x̂
m
)∣∣∣∣ < ε̄1,∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} (5.3)
where we define
F̃A∗i
(
x̂
m
)
:= FA∗i
(
x̂
m
)
−FA∗i
(
x̂− 1
m
)
and F̃ADi (x̂) := P
(
ADi = x̂
)
= FADi (x̂)−FADi (x̂− 1) .
Step 1 We now prove (5.1) in 3 sub-steps.
Step 1.1: Upper bound of the left-hand-side of (5.1). Applying Lemma 5.1 with ε̄1 = ε̄/4, for
any n ≥ N∗, m ≥M0 and any pure strategy x̂A of player A, we have
n∑
i=1
viFBDi
(
x̂Ai − 1
)
≤
n∑
i=1
vi
[
FB∗i
(
x̂Ai − 1
m
)
+
ε̄
4
]
≤
n∑
i=1
vi
(
x̂Ai − 1
m
Vn
2viλ
+
ε̄
4
)
=
n∑
i=1
Vnx̂
A
i
2λm
−
n∑
i=1
Vn
2λm
+
ε̄
4
Vn ≤
Vn
2λ
−
n∑
i=1
Vn
2λm
+
ε̄
4
Vn. (5.4)
Here, the second inequality comes from the definition of FB∗i and the last inequality comes from the
constraint
∑n
i=1 x̂
A
i ≤ m.
7Apparently, if α = 0, then (5.1) implies directly (3.6).
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Step 1.2: Approximation of the right-hand-side of (5.1). We now need to show that the right-
hand-side of (5.1) has a lower bound matching the upper bound given in (5.4). Based on Lemma 5.1
and inequality (5.3), a naive approach would be to simply approximate FBDi (ŷ − 1)P
(
ADi = ŷ
)
by FB∗i
(
ŷ−1
m
)
F̃A∗i
(
ŷ
m
)
, for each ŷ = 0, 1, . . . ,m. However, summing all these approximation
errors would lead to an error in O (mε̄), a large number when m→∞. Hence, we must do a finer
approximation.
To do so, we note that the probability of ADi being larger than
⌈
2vi
Vn
p
⌉
can be bounded from above by
a term independent of m. Specifically, let ε′ := ε̄/8; applying Lemma 5.1 with ε̄1 = ε′/3, for any
n ≥ N∗ and m ≥ M̄ := O (n/ε̄), we get that
P
(
ADi >
⌈
2
vi
Vn
p
⌉)
= 1−FADi
(⌈
2
vi
Vn
p
⌉)
≤ 1−FA∗i
(⌈
2
vi
Vn
p
⌉
1
m
)
+
ε′
3
= 1−1+ ε
′
3
=
ε′
3
,
where the second-last equality comes from the fact that
⌈
2 viVn p
⌉
1
m ≥ 2
vi
Vn
λ. Moreover, this implies∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
m∑
ŷ=0
FBDi (ŷ−1)P
(
ADi = ŷ
)
−
d2 viVn pe∑
ŷ=0
FBDi (ŷ−1)P
(
ADi = ŷ
)∣∣∣∣∣∣∣≤
ε′
3
. (5.5)
Now, we can show that this approximate summation in (5.5) is very close to the term expressed with
FA∗i and FB∗i . Indeed, we have∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
d2 viVn pe∑
ŷ=0
FBDi (ŷ − 1)P
(
ADi = ŷ
)
−
d2 viVn pe∑
ŷ=0
FB∗i
(
ŷ − 1
m
)
F̃A∗i
(
ŷ
m
)∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
d2 viVn pe∑
ŷ=0
FBDi (ŷ − 1)
(
F̃ADi (ŷ)− F̃A∗i
(
ŷ
m
))∣∣∣∣∣∣∣+
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
d2 viVn pe∑
ŷ=0
(
FBDi (ŷ − 1)− FB∗i
(
ŷ − 1
m
))
F̃A∗i
(
ŷ
m
)∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ .
(5.6)
Rearranging the first term and applying corollary (5.3) with ε̄1 := ε′/3, there exists an
MU := O (n/ε̄) such that for m ≥MU , we have∣∣∣∣∑d2 viVn peŷ=0 FBDi (ŷ − 1)
(
F̃ADi (ŷ)− F̃A∗i
(
ŷ
m
))∣∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣∣∑d2 viVn peŷ=0 F̃BDi (ŷ − 1)
(
1− FADi (ŷ)− 1 + FA∗i
(
ŷ
m
))∣∣∣∣
≤
∑d2 viVn pe
ŷ=0
F̃BDi (ŷ − 1)
∣∣∣∣FA∗i ( ŷm
)
− FADi (ŷ)
∣∣∣∣
≤ε
′
3
∑d2 viVn pe
ŷ=0
F̃BDi (ŷ − 1) ≤
ε′
3
. (5.7)
Here, the first inequality comes from the fact that8 FBDi (ŷ − 1) =
ŷ−1∑̂
z=0
F̃BDi (ẑ); which implies
d2 viVn pe∑
ŷ=0
FBDi (ŷ − 1)
(
F̃ADi (ŷ)− F̃A∗i
(
ŷ
m
))
=
d2 viVn pe∑
ŷ=0
ŷ−1∑
ẑ=0
F̃BDi (ẑ)
(
F̃ADi (ŷ)− F̃A∗i
(
ŷ
m
))
8We recall the notation that F̃BDi (x) = FBDi (x)− FBDi (x− 1), ∀x
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=
d 2viVn pe∑
ŷ=1
F̃BDi (ŷ − 1)
d
2vi
Vn
pe∑
ẑ=ŷ
F̃ADi (ẑ)−
d 2viVn pe∑
ẑ=ŷ
F̃A∗i (
ẑ
m
)

≤
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
d2 viVn pe∑
ŷ=0
F̃BDi (ŷ − 1)
(
1− FADi (ŷ)− 1 + FA∗i
(
ŷ
m
))∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ .
For the second term of (5.6), we use again Lemma 5.1 with ε̄1 := ε′/3 to get M̄ such that for
m ≥ M̄ ,∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
d2 viVn pe∑
ŷ=0
(
FBDi (ŷ − 1)− FB∗i
(
ŷ − 1
m
))
F̃A∗i
(
ŷ
m
)∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
∑d2 viVn pe
ŷ=1
ε′
3
∣∣∣∣F̃A∗i ( ŷm
)∣∣∣∣
=
∑d2 viVn pe
ŷ=1
ε′
3
∣∣∣∣FA∗i ( ŷm
)
− FA∗i
(
ŷ − 1
m
)∣∣∣∣ ≤∑d2 viVn peŷ=1 ε′3m Vn2viλ2
=
ε′
3m
Vn
2viλ2
·
⌈
2vi
Vn
p
⌉
≤ ε
′
3m
Vn
2viλ2
·
(
2vi
Vn
p+ 1
)
≤ ε
′
3λ
+
ε′(λ− 1)
3λ
=
ε′
3
,∀m ≥MV , (5.8)
where we choose MV := max
{
M̄, 3nvmaxλ2vmin(λ−1)
}
= O(n/ε̄).
Finally, by injecting (5.7) and (5.8) into (5.6) and combining with (5.5), we conclude that for any
n ≥ N∗ and m ≥M1 = max {MU ,MV } = O (n/ε̄),∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
m∑
ŷ=0
FBDi (ŷ−1)P
(
ADi = ŷ
)
−
d2 viVn pe∑
ŷ=0
FB∗i
(
ŷ−1
m
)
F̃A∗i
(
ŷ
m
)∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ ε′. (5.9)
Step 1.3: Lower bound of right-hand-side of (5.1). We can finally find a lower bound of the
approximated sum in (5.9) (see proof in Appendix):
Lemma 5.2. Fix λ ≥ 1. For any ε′ ∈ (0, 1] and n ≥ N∗, there exists an M2 := O (n/ε′), such that
for any m ≥ M2, we have
n∑
i=1
vid2
vi
Vn
pe∑
ŷ=0
FB∗i
(
ŷ−1
m
)
F̃A∗i
(
ŷ
m
) ≥ Vn
2λ
−
n∑
i=1
Vn
2λm
− ε′Vn. (5.10)
Conclusion of step 1. Combining (5.9) and (5.10) (with ε′ = ε̄/8), for any n ≥ N∗ and
m ≥ MA1 := max {M0,M1,M2} = O
(
n
ε̄
)
, we have that
n∑
i=1
vi m∑
ŷ=0
FBDi (ŷ − 1)P
(
ADi = ŷ
) ≥ Vn
2λ
−
∑n
i=1
Vn
2λm
− 2Vnε′
≥
n∑
i=1
viFBDi
(
x̂Ai − 1
)
− ε̄
4
Vn − 2Vnε′, (from (5.4))
which implies exactly (5.1) (recall that ε′ = ε̄/8).
Step 2: Proof of inequality (5.2). Choosing any ε2 = O(ε̄), as another corol-
lary of lemma 5.1, for any n ≥ N∗ = O
(
ε̄−2 ln(ε̄−1)
)
and m ≥M ′ = O (n/ε̄)),
we have that P
(
BDi = x̂
)
= FBDi (x̂)− FBDi (x̂− 1) is ε2-approximated by
F̃B∗i
(
x̂
m
)
:= FB∗i
(
x̂
m
)
− FB∗i
(
x̂−1
m
)
, ∀x̂ ∈ N,∀i. We now prove that inequality (5.2) holds
∀α 6= 0 by proving that P (BDi = x̂Ai ) gets arbitrary small when m and n increases.
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- Case 1: if x̂Ai /∈
[
1, 2viVn p+ 1
]
, we have FB∗i
(
x̂Ai
m
)
= FB∗i
(
x̂Ai −1
m
)
(either both terms equal 0 or
either they equal 1). By choosing ε2 = ε̄/(2α) then P
(
BDi = x̂
A
i
)
is ε2-close to 0, which trivially
leads to (5.2) when m ≥M ′.
- Case 2: if x̂Ai ∈
[
1, 2viVn p
]
, we have F̃B∗i
(
x̂Ai
m
)
= 1m
Vn
2viλ
.
On the other hand, if x̂Ai =
⌈
2vi
Vn
p
⌉
, since λ = pm , we also have
F̃B∗i
(
1
m
⌈
2vi
Vn
p
⌉)
= 1−
⌈
2vi
Vn
p
⌉
− 1
m
Vn
2viλ
≤ 1−
2vi
Vn
p
m
Vn
2viλ
+
1
m
Vn
2viλ
=
1
m
Vn
2viλ
.
Therefore, we choose ε2 = ε̄/(4α) and deduce that for any
m ≥MA2 := max
{
M ′, 2αnvmaxε̄vminλ
}
= O(n/ε̄), for any xAi , we have
P
(
BDi = x̂
A
i
)
≤ F̃B∗i
(
1
m
⌈
2vi
Vn
p
⌉)
+
ε̄
4α
≤ 1
m
Vn
2viλ
+
ε̄
4α
≤ ε̄
4α
+
ε̄
4α
=
ε̄
2α
.
This also directly implies (5.2).
Step 3: Conclusion of the proof. Having proved inequalities (5.1) and (5.2), we conclude the
proof of (3.6) by taking M∗ := max
{
MA1 ,M
A
2
}
= O (n/ε̄).
We can prove similarly (3.7) for player B and conclude that DIU strategy is indeed an ε̄Vn-equilibrium
of the game.
6 Concluding discussion
In this work, we propose the DIU strategy, defined by a simple algorithm, and prove it to be an
approximate equilibrium of the discrete Colonel Blotto game. The results also show precisely how
large the number of troops and the number of battlefields of the game should be to ensure a certain
level of approximation. We construct a best-response dynamic programming algorithm and evaluate
the approximation error of employing the DIU strategy in practice via several numerical experiments.
Our work extends the scope of applications of discrete Colonel Blotto games by trading off the
accuracy with the computational efficiency, which is useful for analyzing games with large values of
the parameters.
Due to space constraints, we have not emphasized the dependence of the approximation on the
parameters expressing the asymmetry of the game, but our proof technique allows analyzing that
as well. Note finally that Theorem 3.2 proves that the DIU strategy is an approximate equilibrium,
that is no unilateral deviation can significantly improve a player’s payoff. This does not directly imply
that the marginals obtained under the DIU strategy are close to the marginals of the exact equilibria,
although we conjecture that this is true as well (and leave its proof for future work).
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Appendix
To prove Lemma 5.1, we first need the uniform convergence of the continuous distributions FAni
and FBni towards FA∗i and FB∗i (defined in (3.5) and (3.1), (3.2)). This is stated as follows.
Lemma 6.1. Fix λ ≥ 1, for any εc ∈ (0, 1], there exists an N∗ := O
(
ε−2c ln(ε
−1
c )
)
such that for
any n ≥ N∗ and i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, we have
sup
x∈[0,∞)
∣∣FAni (x)− FA∗i (x)∣∣ ≤ εc and sup
x∈[0,∞)
∣∣FBni (x)− FB∗i (x)∣∣ ≤ εc.
Proof. Choosing δ := εcvminλ
2
nvmax
, for any i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, we have
P (|Ani −A∗i | > δ) = P

∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
A∗i
n∑
j=1
A∗j
−A∗i
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ > δ

= P
∣∣∣∣∣∣A∗i
1− n∑
j=1
A∗j
∣∣∣∣∣∣ > δ
∣∣∣∣∣∣
n∑
j=1
A∗j
∣∣∣∣∣∣

≤ P
∣∣∣∣∣∣A∗i
1− n∑
j=1
A∗j
∣∣∣∣∣∣ > δ − δ
∣∣∣∣∣∣1−
n∑
j=1
A∗j
∣∣∣∣∣∣

= P
∣∣∣∣∣∣(A∗i + δ)
1− n∑
j=1
A∗j
∣∣∣∣∣∣ > δ

≤ P
∣∣∣∣∣∣1−
n∑
j=1
A∗j
∣∣∣∣∣∣ > δ2 vmaxλnvmin + δ
 . (6.1)
The last equality comes from the fact that the random variable A∗i is upper bounded by
2 viVnλ ≤ 2
vmax
nvmin
λ,∀i. Let τ := δ
2 vmaxλnvmin
+δ
. Using the fact that E
[
n∑
j=1
A∗j
]
= 1 and applying the
Hoeffding’s inequality on bounded random variables {A∗i }i∈{1,2,...,n} (in the range
[
0, 2 vmaxnvminλ
]
),
we have
P
∣∣∣∣∣∣1−
n∑
j=1
A∗j
∣∣∣∣∣∣ > τ
 ≤ P
∣∣∣∣∣∣E
 n∑
j=1
A∗j
− n∑
j=1
A∗j
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ τ

≤ 2 exp
− 2τ2n∑
i=1
(
2vi
Vn
λ
)2

≤ 2 exp
− 2τ2
λ2n 4n2
(
vmax
vmin
)2

= 2 exp
(
−τ
2n
2λ2
(
vmax
vmin
)2)
. (6.2)
On the other hand,
1
τ2
=
(
2vmaxλ
nvminδ
+ 1
)2
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=
(
2vmaxλ
nvmin
εcvminλ2
nvmax
+ 1
)2
=
(
2
(
vmax
vmin
)2
1
εcλ
+ 1
)2
≤ U := 1
ε2c
[
2
λ
(
vmax
vmin
)2
+ 1
]2
, since ε2c ≤ εc ≤ 1.
That means, τ2 ≥ 1U . Therefore, by the fact that E[
n∑
j=1
A∗j ] = 1, we have:
P (|Ani −A∗i | > δ) ≤ 2 exp
(
− n
2Uλ2
(
vmax
vmin
)2)
≤ εc
2
,∀n ≥ N∗
where
N∗ := 2Uλ2 ln
(
4
εc
)(
vmin
vmax
)2
=
2
ε2c
[
2
(
vmax
vmin
)2
+ λ
]2
ln
(
4
εc
)(
vmin
vmax
)2
= O(ε−2c ln(ε−1c )).
Now, for any i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} and x ∈ [0,∞),
FAni (x)− FA∗i (x) = P ({A
n
i ≤ x})− FA∗i (x)
≤ P ({Ani ≤ x} ∩ {|Ani −A∗i | ≤ δ}) + P (|Ani −A∗i | > δ)− FA∗i (x)
≤ P ({Ani ≤ x} ∩ {A∗i ≤ Ani + δ}) + P (|Ani −A∗i | > δ)− FA∗i (x)
≤ P (A∗i ≤ x+ δ) +
εc
2
− FA∗i (x) ,∀n ≥ N
∗
= FA∗i (x+ δ)− FA∗i (x) +
εc
2
,∀n ≥ N∗
≤ δ
2 viVnλ
2
+
εc
2
,∀n ≥ N∗
≤ εc,∀n ≥ N∗.
Similarly, we can deduce the inequality FAni (x)− FA∗i (x) ≥ −εc,∀x ∈ [0,∞),∀n ≥ N
∗,∀i and
we conclude that sup
x∈[0,∞)
∣∣FAni (x)− FA∗i (x)∣∣ ≤ εc.
The inequality corresponding to player B sup
x∈[0,∞)
∣∣FBni (x)− FB∗i (x)∣∣ ≤ εc can be proved in a
similar way (the bounds in the above proof are chosen for both random variables {A∗i }i and {B∗i }i,
thus, the precise definition of N∗ given above also works to prove this inequality).
Proof of Lemma 5.1
Lemma 5.1. Fix λ ≥ 1, for any ε̄1 ∈ (0, 1], there exists N∗ := O
(
ε̄−21 ln
(
ε̄−11
))
, such that for any
n ≥ N∗, there exists M0 := O (n/ε̄1), such that for any m ≥M0 and i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, we have
sup
x̂∈N
∣∣∣∣FADi (x̂)− FA∗i
(
x̂
m
)∣∣∣∣ < ε̄1 and sup
x̂∈N
∣∣∣∣FBDi (x̂)− FB∗i
(
x̂
m
)∣∣∣∣ < ε̄1.
Proof. For any random variables U and V , from the definition of rounding function rm, for any
m, x̂ ∈ N, we have9
U − V ≤ x̂
m
⇒ rm (U)− rm (V ) ≤ x̂
m
⇒ U − V < x̂+ 1
m
,
9If U − V ≤ x̂
m
, then rm(U) ≤ rm (V + x̂/m) = rm(V ) + x̂/m. If rm (U)− rm (V ) ≤ x̂/m, then
U < rm(U) + 1
2m
≤ rm(V ) + x̂
m
+ 1
2m
≤ V + x̂+1
m
.
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which induces
P
(
U − V ≤ x̂
m
)
≤ P
(
rm (U)− rm (V ) ≤ x̂
m
)
≤ P
(
U − V ≤ x̂+ 1
m
)
.
Therefore, for each i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, by replacing U :=
∑i
k=1A
n
k and V :=
∑i−1
k=1A
n
k together
with definition of ADi given in (3.3), for any x̂ ∈ N, we have
FAni
(
x̂
m
)
≤ FADi (x̂) ≤ FAni
(
x̂+ 1
m
)
.
On the other hand, applying Lemma 6.1 with εc := ε̄1/2, for any
n ≥ N∗ := O
(
ε−2c ln(ε
−1
c )
)
= O
(
ε̄−21 ln(ε̄
−1
1 )
)
, for any i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, we have∣∣∣∣FAni ( x̂m
)
− FA∗i
(
x̂
m
)∣∣∣∣ < ε̄12 and
∣∣∣∣FAni ( x̂+ 1m
)
− FA∗i
(
x̂+ 1
m
)∣∣∣∣ < ε̄12 .
Therefore, for any n ≥ N∗, for any x̂,m ∈ N, we have that
FA∗i
(
x̂
m
)
− ε̄1
2
< FADi (x̂) < FA
∗
i
(
x̂+ 1
m
)
+
ε̄1
2
⇒FA∗i
(
x̂
m
)
− ε̄1
2
< FADi (x̂) < FA
∗
i
(
x̂
m
)
+
1
m
Vn
2viλ2
+
ε̄1
2
. (6.3)
The last inequality in (6.3) is trivially deduced from the definition of A∗i . Now, we can choose
M0 :=
nvmax
ε̄1vminλ2
= O (n/ε̄1) such that for m ≥M0, 1m
Vn
2viλ2
≤ 1M0
Vn
2viλ2
= ε̄1vminλ
2
nvmax
Vn
2viλ2
≤ ε̄12 .
Combining with (6.3), we conclude that for any n ≥ N∗, m ≥ M0, we have
sup
x̂∈N
∣∣∣FADi (x̂)− FA∗i ( x̂m)∣∣∣ < ε̄1.
The inequality respected to FBDi and FB∗i can be similarly proven.
Proof of Lemma 5.2
Lemma 5.2. Fix λ ≥ 1. For any ε′ ∈ (0, 1] and n ≥ N∗, there exists an M2 := O (n/ε′), such that
for any m ≥ M2, we have
n∑
i=1
vid2
vi
Vn
pe∑
ŷ=0
FB∗i
(
ŷ−1
m
)
F̃A∗i
(
ŷ
m
) ≥ Vn
2λ
−
n∑
i=1
Vn
2λm
− ε′Vn. (5.10)
Proof. Recalling that F̃A∗i
(
ŷ
m
)
= FA∗i
(
ŷ
m
)
− FA∗i
(
ŷ−1
m
)
, to ease the notation, for any
ŷ = 1, 2, . . . ,
⌈
2 viVn p
⌉
− 1, we denote
FB∗i
(
ŷ − 1
m
)
F̃A∗i
(
ŷ
m
)
=
(ŷ − 1) (Vn)2
λm2(2viλ)
2 := g (ŷ) ,
while FB∗i
(
d2 viVn pe−1
m
)
F̃A∗i
(
d2 viVn pe
m
)
does not have the form g
(⌈
2 viVn p
⌉)
.
Then, we have
d 2viVn pe∑
ŷ=0
[
FB∗i
(
ŷ − 1
m
)
F̃A∗i
(
ŷ
m
)]
=
d 2viVn pe−1∑
ŷ=1
g (ŷ) + FB∗i

⌈
2 viVn p
⌉
− 1
m
 F̃A∗i

⌈
2 viVn p
⌉
m

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=
d 2viVn pe∑
ŷ=1
g (ŷ) +
FB∗i

⌈
2 viVn p
⌉
− 1
m
 F̃A∗i

⌈
2 viVn p
⌉
m
− g(⌈2 vi
Vn
p
⌉)
:=E1 + E2. (6.4)
Here, the term E1 will be bounded from below by an approximation of the upper bound given in
(5.4), which is the objective of this lemma. Indeed, for any m ≥ ME1 := nvmax√2λε′vminλ ≤ O (n/ε
′),
we have
E1 :=
∑d 2viVn pe
ŷ=1
g (ŷ) =
(Vn)
2
λm2(2viλ)
2
∑d 2viVn pe
ŷ=1
(ŷ − 1)
=
(Vn)
2
λm2(2viλ)
2
d 2viVn pe∑
ŷ=1
ŷ − (Vn)
2
λm2(2viλ)
2
d 2viVn pe∑
ŷ=1
1
=
(Vn)
2
λm2(2viλ)
2
(⌈
2vi
Vn
p
⌉
+ 1
)⌈
2vi
Vn
p
⌉
− (Vn)
2
λm2(2viλ)
2
⌈
2vi
Vn
p
⌉
≥
(
2vi
Vn
p
m
)2
(
2 viVnλ
)2 12λ − 2
vi
Vn
p+ 1
λm2
(
2 viVnλ
)2 ≥ 12λ − 1m Vn2viλ − ε
′
2
. (6.5)
Here, the last inequality in (6.5) comes from λ := pm ≥ 1 and m ≥ME1 .
By similar reasoning, we can prove that for any m ≥ME2 := nvmaxε′λ2vmin = O (n/ε
′), since p = λm,
we have
E2 :=
FB∗i

⌈
2 viVn p
⌉
− 1
m
 F̃A∗i

⌈
2 viVn p
⌉
m
− g(⌈2 vi
Vn
p
⌉)
=
(⌈
2vi
Vn
p
⌉
− 1
)
Vn
2vimλ
(
1
λ
−
⌈
2vi
Vn
p
⌉
Vn
2vimλ2
)
≥
(⌈
2vi
Vn
p
⌉
− 1
)
Vn
2vimλ
(
1
λ
− 2vip
Vn
Vn
2vimλ2
− Vn
2vimλ2
)
=
(⌈
2vi
Vn
p
⌉
− 1
)
Vn
2vimλ
(
− Vn
2vimλ2
)
≥−
(
2vi
Vn
p
)
Vn
2vimλ
(
Vn
2vimλ2
)
≥− ε
′
2
.
Combining this with the inequalities (6.4) and (6.5), for any n ≥ N∗ and
m ≥M2 := max {ME1 ,ME2} = O
(
n
ε′
)
, we conclude that
n∑
i=1
vi d2
vi
Vn
pe∑
ŷ=0
FB∗i
(
ŷ − 1
m
)
F̃A∗i
(
ŷ
m
) ≥ n∑
i=1
vi
(
1
2λ
− 1
m
Vn
2viλ
− ε′
)
,
which is exactly (5.10).
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